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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Institutional racism in housing markets has a long standing history in 
this country. In 1938 the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) wrote 
in its Underwriting Manual: 
Areas surrounding a location are investigated to determine 
whether incompatible racial and social groups are 
present, for the purpose of making a prediction regarding 
the probability of the location being invaded by such 
groups. If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is 
necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by 
the same social and racial classes. A change in social or 
racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a 
decline in values (Berry, 1979, p. 9). 
The views expressed in this manual were based on the conclusions 
of some of the leading real estate analysts of the time. For example, in 
1933 Homer Hoyt wrote: 
If the entrance of a colored family into a white 
neighborhood causes a general exodus of the white 
people it is reflected in property values. Except in 
the case of Negroes and Mexicans, however, these 
racial and national barriers d isappear when 
individuals in the foreign nationality groups rise in 
the economic scale or conformto the American 
standards of living (Berry, 1979, p. 9). 
and later: 
While the ranking below may be scientifically wrong from 
the standpoint of inherent racial characteristics, it 
registers an opinion or prejudice that is reflected in land 
values; it is the ranking of races and nationalities with 
respect to their beneficial effect upon land values. Those 
having the most favorable effect come first in the list and 
those exerting the most detrimental effect appear last: 1. 
English, Germans, Scotch, Irish, Scandinavians. 2. North 
Italians. 3. Bohemians or Czechoslovakia's. 4. Poles. 5. 
Lithuanians. 6. Greeks. 7. Russian Jews of the lower class. 
8. South Italians. 9. Negroes. 10. Mexicans (Berry, 1979, p. 
408). 
Writings of this type have had long lasting effects on the mortgage 
market. In many instances mortgage lending policy has become based 
on geographic location or factors other than the credit worthiness of 
the applicant. This type of lending policy, commonly referred to as 
"redlining", is very detrimental to the neighborhood that is excluded. 
Without mortgage money, homes become unaffordable for purchase 
and rehabilitation. Not only do individuals of a certain race and class 
suffer within redlined neighborhoods, but eventually the absence of 
such funds leads to the blight and decline of the entire neighborhood 
(Meyerson, 1986, p. 196). Redlining also violates federal law (Federal 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601-3619, 3631, 1976)(Squires and 
Velez, 1987, p. 65). This research examines mortgage lending 
patterns in the Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area. It concludes that, 
despite laws to the contrary, it is more difficult for potential 
homeowners in predominantly black neighborhoods to obtain 
mortgages from depository financial institutions, than it is for their 
white counterparts to obtain mortgages from these same institutions. 
Federal Efforts to Eliminate Redlining 
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) and the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) are two Congressional 
attempts to eliminate the practice of redlining. Redlining is strongly 
related to neighborhood decay; without credit, residents cannot buy or 
finance repairs for their homes, and businesses cannot expand or 
modernize. The stated purpose of the HMDA is to 
... provide the citizens and public officials of the United 
States with sufficient information to enable them to 
determine whether depository institutions aire fulfilling 
their obligations to serve the housing needs of the 
communities and neighborhoods in which they are 
located** ( P.L. 94-200, Sect. 302(b)). 
The Act requires all federally chartered or insured banks, savings and 
loans, and credit unions located in metropolitan areas with assets of 
$10 million or more to disclose publicly the geographic location of 
home mortgage and home improvement loans ( P.L. 94-200, Sect. 
302(b)). 
HMDA was enacted in response to the active support of 
community groups and other local citizens' organizations. HMDA 
statements supplied by regulated lending institutions show, by census 
tract, the number and amount of all home mortgage and home 
improvement loans made by a given institution during the calendar 
year in the metropolitan area in which they operate (Center for 
Community Change, 1983, p. 3). Initially, HMDA data was reported on 
the basis of postal zip codes, which at the time were very difficult to 
compare with socio-economic data, which is reported most 
extensively on a census tract basis. Subsequent changes in the law now 
require that the data be reported on a census tract basis, making it 
possible to evaluate racial and economic characteristics of the areas in 
which the reporting institution is making loans. HMDA statements 
have some limitations. They do not state the number of whites and 
blacks that have applied for loans, nor do they give any reasons for 
denial of credit. HMDA statements do not include every home loan in a 
metro area because not all lenders are required by law to report their 
loans. Nonetheless, these statements have proven to be a very valuable 
tool for promoting, monitoring, and facilitating neighborhood 
reinvestment. 
The Community Reinvestment Act takes HMDA a step further. 
The CRA is a reaffirmation of the concept that banks are granted 
federal and state charters to help meet the deposit and credit needs 
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of the local communities in which they operate or are located, 
including the needs of low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. The 
rationale behind this obligation lies in the fact that banks have some 
special privileges, including a charter to do business , deposit 
insurance, and accessibility to special borrowing privileges at the 
Federal Reserve Discount Window and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (A Citizens Guide. 1983. p. 1). 
The CRA sets the guidelines for determining a lending 
institution's attempts to meet the needs of its community. For 
example, the institution must make an active effort to ascertain the 
community's credit needs. There should be no practices by the lender 
that could discourage application for credit, such as only offering loan 
applications at branches in wealthier neighborhoods. The geographic 
distribution of the lender's loans should not fail to serve certain lower 
income or minority neighborhoods. Loans and special credit-related 
programs should be marketed within the community. The institution 
should be active in community development projects such a s 
Community Development Corporations and local neighborhood 
preservation efforts. The lender's record of opening and closing offices 
should not demonstrate an exodus from lower income or minority 
neighborhoods (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
[FIEC] 1985, p. 3). 
If an institution fails to live up to its CRA obligations, the action 
that is taken depends on which agency is responsible for supervising 
that particular institution. The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (FRB) supervises state-chartered banks that are 
members of the Federal Reserve System (state member banks). The 
FRB must consider a state member bank's CRA performance when 
reviewing a bank's application for establishment of a branch office or 
other depos i t facility; re locat ion of a b r a n c h office; 
merger,consolidation with, or acquisition of the assets of another bank 
if the surviving bank is a state member. The FRB must also consider 
CRA performance whenever an institution is applying for Federal 
Reserve System membership. If the FRB believes that the member 
bank's CRA activities are not what they should be, the application can 
be denied (FIEC, 1985, p. 4). 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) supervises 
state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve 
System. It also supervises state-chartered savings banks insured by the 
FDIC, and FDIC-insured state branches of foreign banks. The FDIC 
must consider an institution's CRA performance when reviewing an 
institution's application for federal deposit insurance; establishment 
of a branch office or other deposit facility; merger or consolidation 
with, or acquisition of the assets of, another financial institution when 
the resulting bank will be supervised by the FDIC or will be uninsured; 
relocation of a branch office. Once again, the institution's application 
can be denied if its CRA performance is not satisfactory (FIEC, 1985, 
p. 5). 
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) supervises federal 
savings and loan associations, federal savings banks and, through the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), state-
chartered savings institutions whose accounts are insured by the 
FSLIC. The FHLBB must consider CRA performance when reviewing a 
federal savings institution's application for permission to organize a 
new federal savings institution or obtain a federal charter; FSLIC 
deposit insurance; the establishment of a branch office; the relocation 
of home or branch offices; or merger or consolidation with, or 
acquisition of the assets and assumptions of the liabilities of another 
savings institution. The FHLBB is also responsible for enforcing CRA 
provisions whenever a state chartered institution insured by the FSLIC 
applies for a consolidation or merger with, or acquisition of the assets 
and assumptions of the liabilities of another savings institution. The 
FHLBB also regulates savings and loan holding companies and must 
consider CRA performance whenever one of these institutions seeks to 
acquire control of a savings institution insured by the FSLIC (FIEC, 
1985, p. 5). 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency supervises 
national banks and must evaluate CRA performance whenever such an 
institution applies for new national bank charters; domestic branch 
offices and other deposit facilities for existing national banks; 
conversions from state charter to a national charter; mergers, 
consolidations, purchase of assets and assumptions of liabilities where 
the surviving bank is a national bank; insured federal branches of 
foreign banks; relocation of a national bank office, except the 
relocation of the head office to an existing branch within the same city 
(FIEC, 1985, p. 7). 
The reason it is important to know which agency is regulating 
which types of banks and what types of actions are subject to a CRA 
challenge is that citizens and community based groups have a very 
important role in the CRA review process . If a citizen or community 
group has reason to believe that a bank or savings and loan is not 
meeting its CRA obligation, a letter may be filed in the institution's 
public comment file. The regulating agency takes the contents of this 
file into consideration when reviewing an institution's performance. 
Individuals and groups can also file challenges when a regulated 
institution is asking its regulator to approve an action covered under 
the CRA. The challenge, in effect, asks the regulators not to approve 
the institutions proposed action based on its poor CRA performance. 
The CRA is a very general statute that gives broad discretion to the 
people and agencies that administer it. The degree of enforcement at 
the agency level depends on the attitude of the regulators. Only eight 
times in 40,000 cases have federal regulators used the CRA to penalize 





Prior to 1975, studies on lending patterns were very time 
consuming, and, as a result, often limited to a small geographic area. 
Every transaction in an area had to be sought out, either via the county 
title record or through a commercial real estate directory. Those 
institutions providing financing for each transaction had to be 
tabulated by hand, a very slow process. These early studies 
concentrated on individual neighborhoods rather than whole cities, 
therefore utilizing a very small sample size. In addition, the studies 
concentrated on neighborhoods that were not typical urban 
neighborhoods. Instead, the neighborhoods were in very poor 
condition, often terminal in nature. As a result, those studies showed 
that racial discrimination in mortgage lending was present in the 
atypical terminal neighborhood: a very limited finding (Listokin and 
Casey, 1980, p. 27-28). 
Listokin and Casey (1980) identify three main categories into 
which studies of lending data fall: (1) political-economic, which views 
mortgage shortfalls as a manifestation of deficiencies in the overall 
political-economic system; (2) minority housing opportunity, which 
considers the shortfall to be one result of the overall discriminatory 
network encountered by minorities; and (3) empirical and eco-race, 
which attributes the mortgage crunch to the economic and eco-race 
models of lender behavior (Listokin and Casey, 1980, p. 33). 
Political-economic studies are largely influenced by Marxist 
thought and evaluate the formation of cities, suburban outmigration, 
and urban problems in terms of the Marxian view of labor, capital, and 
class exploitation. This group of studies attributes the problem of 
credit shortfall to the behavior of profit-motivated lenders (Listokin 
and Casey. 1980. p. 35). Harvey (1973) and O'Connor (1973) are two 
examples of research of this type. 
Minority housing opportunity studies focus on the role 
discrimination plays in causing minorities to pay more for housing 
than whites, discrimination's contribution to the relatively low rate of 
minority homeownership, and whether discrimination forces 
minorities to live in cities, limiting their access to employment and 
educational opportunities (Listokin and Casey, 1980, p. 36). Kain and 
Quigley (1975) showed that, compared to whites, blacks in St. Louis 
have a lower incidence of homeownership and pay more for housing. 
Their research concluded that those difference were caused by 
discriminatory supply restrictions resulting from the actions of 
realtors and loan officials (Listokin and Casey. 1980. p. 37). 
The economic model stresses the lenders' reliance on purely 
economic criteria when evaluating a loan application. The eco-race 
models argue that lenders are guided by racial as well as economic 
policies. (Listokin and Casey, 1980, p. 33). The analysis of mortgage 
redlining in Atlanta reported here is based on the economic and eco-
race approach used by Listokin and Casey (1980) and Shlay (1987). A 
summary of those studies now follows. 
Listokin and Casey 
Listokin and Casey (1980) analyzed lending data from a 1973 
survey conducted by the FHLBB on lending activity in Chicago, 1971-
73, and a 1974 Comptroller of the Currency survey that made public 
certain data on loans and loan applications in 18 SMSAs processed 
between J u n e and November 1974. The Chicago study made available 
the results of a FHLBB survey of 189 lenders who were asked to 
complete a complex form showing their lending activity in Chicago. 
Data from the survey consisted of the zip codes where all loans on 1-4 
family dwellings were made by the lenders from J u n e 30,1971 to June 
30, 1973, the terms of the mortgage including interest rate and loan-
to-value ratio (LVR); and the zip code for all construction and home 
improvement loans made during the same time period. The response 
rate for the survey was 80%. The survey did not profile the successful 
and unsuccessful bidder for credit. Loan activity of mortgage bankers 
was not included in the survey (p. 57-59). 
The Comptroller of the Currency study addressed the social and 
economic characteristics of loan applicants. Lenders in 18 SMSAs 
were asked to make public certain information on loans and loan 
applications made between J u n e and November, 1974. Although the 
information was collected on a geographic basis, only aggregate data 
were made public. The most important aspect of this study is the 
wealth of information on the social and economic characteristics of 
both the successful and unsuccessful applicants. The data included 
income of head of household, spouse's income, number of years head 
of household has been employed, number of years spouse has been 
employed, assets, total debt, and total debt payments. The property to 
be mortgaged was also described in terms of purchase price and 
whether it was to be owner occupied. The size of the loan was also 
included, permitting the calculation of the LVR. The data was made 
available for nearly 13,000 loan applications (Listokin and Casey, 1980, 
p. 58). 
Listokin and Casey applied regression analysis on the FHLBB data 
to determine whether race was an underwriting criterion. Their 
conclusion was that race explained about 50 percent of the variation in 
loans after controlling for economic factors such a s income, 
employment history, and home purchase price. Their analysis showed 
that racial composition of a neighborhood was statistically significantly 
related to loans granted (1980, p. 90). 
The Comptroller of the Currency study revealed that 23 percent 
of the nonwhite mortgage applicants were rejected, compared to a 15 
percent rejection rate for whites. Using chi square analysis analysis, 
however, Listokin and Casey showed that this difference was 
nonetheless significant after controlling for economic characteristics. 
Four economic variables - income, assets , LVR, and purchase price 
were determined to be significant in terms of loan disposition. Their 
research revealed that race was statistically significantly associated 
with disposition of a loan after controlling for economic factors (1980, 
p. 130-135). 
Shlav 
Unfortunately, neither of those sources of data used by Listokin 
and Casey undertake periodic updating. Only current HMDA data or 
lending records are readily available. Using that data Shlay studied 
mortgage lending patterns in Baltimore (1987). Shlay examined 
lending patterns in three Baltimore submarkets: the suburban lending 
market and two Baltimore City lending markets - gentrifying 
neighborhoods and non-gentrifying neighborhoods. Two types of 
analyses were conducted. The first type of analysis used two different 
techniques to determine where the money flowed. The first technique 
examined the total volume of loans made in Baltimore and its suburbs 
as it related to each area's share of local housing stocks for which 
loans can be made. This "fair share" analysis addressed whether areas' 
respective share of lending were comparable, less than, or exceeded 
their share of the region's housing. The second technique analyzed the 
distribution of credit among census tracts relative to the housing stock 
in place in 1980. Shlay used multivariate techniques to account for 
disparities in lending among census tracts within each of the lending 
submarkets. The second type of analysis examined the relationship 
between mortgage lending patterns and racial composition while 
controlling for local income levels and housing stocks (p. 10). 
Shlay's initial research yielded several conclusions about overall 
lending patterns in Baltimore. The Baltimore suburbs have consistently 
received substantial amounts of all types of residential financing. 
Relative to their share of the local housing stock, the suburbs received 
more than its fair share of conventional single family finance. All in all, 
the suburbs represented the dominate lending market for the 
Baltimore area's residential finance industry (Shlay, 1987, p. 30). 
Gentrifying areas represented the main lending submarket for 
single family conventional finance within the central city. Lending 
volumes for single family conventional loans in gentrifying areas was 
comparable to lending volumes experienced in the suburbs . 
Gentrifying areas represented the lowest volume market for home 
improvement loans, however, compared to either the suburbs or non-
gentrifying areas (Shlay, 1987 p. 30). 
Non-gentrifying areas represented the lowest volume market for 
conventional single-family loans. Non-gentrifying areas did, however, 
receive a larger volume of home improvement loans. For home 
improvement loans, non-gentrifying areas received lending volumes 
comparable to the suburbs (Shlay 1987, p. 31). 
When race and income were factored in, Shlay found that within 
the city, 95 percent of all moderate to middle income black census 
tracts (median income between 50-120 percent of SMSA median, 
black population greater than or equal to 75 percent) received a "low" 
volume of loans (less than 30 loans per 1000 eligible structures). Only 
5 percent of the black tracts received a "medium" level of lending 
(between 30-60 loans per 1000 eligible structures). No black census 
tracts received a "high" volume of loans (greater than or equal to 60 
loans per 1000 eligible structures). Only 27 percent of the moderate 
and middle income white census tracts (median income between 50-
120 percent of SMSA median, black population less than 25 percent) 
received a "low" volume of loans. Sixty-one percent received a 
"medium" volume of loans, and 12 percent received a "high" volume of 
loans (Shlay, 1987, p. 34). 
In the suburbs there were only three black census tracts, each 
with a median income greater than 80 percent of the SMSA median. A 
clear statistical relationship between race and lending could not be 
tested. Nevertheless, two of these tracts received a "low" level of 
lending (66 percent), while one received a "high" level of lending (33 
percent). Only 18 percent of the white tracts experienced a "low" level 
of lending. Forty-one percent received a "medium" level, while 42 
percent received a "high" level. These results indicate that on a raw 
number basis (loans per 1000 owner-occupied structures), regulated 
lenders in Baltimore make more loans in white areas than in black 
areas. (Shlay, 1987, p. 36). 
In an effort to get a more precise measurement of the 
relationship between lending and race, Shlay introduced several 
market factors hypothesized to influence lending volume. The factors 
were family composition, population turnover, socio-economic status, 
new development, age of the housing stock, vacancy rates, size of the 
housing stock, and the presence or absence of residential land use, 
and race. Each census tract was evaluated in terms of these factors. 
Using multivariate regression, Shlay estimated the percent change in 
the dependent variable (i.e. volume of lending) for a unit change in the 
independent variable (e.g. vacancy rate, etc.). In both Baltimore City 
and its suburbs /hous ing and population characteristics explained a 
large part of the variation In single family lending volume among 
various census tracts. Areas of higher income levels, fewer single 
people, higher population turnover, more expensive housing, higher 
vacancy rates, and more housing available for lending received more 
conventional single family loans than other areas. 
In addition to the market factors, race also explained variations 
in both amount and total number of loans received. In Baltimore an 
increase of one percent in black population was associated with 0.5 
percent fewer loans received, and 0.7 percent less value of loans 
received. In the suburban market, each percent increase in black 
population meant a 0.8 percent fewer loans received, and 1.0 percent 
less value of loans received. Shlay concludes that "throughout the 
Baltimore metropolitan region, the variation in areaV conventional 
single family credit flows was due, in part, to the race of local 
residents" (1987, p. 40-43). 
Literature to date shows that mortgage lending flows are 
influenced by race. Early writings on this subject suggested that as a 
geographical area's population became more black, the property value 
in that area would decline. This set of circumstances would lead to 
higher risks in terms of mortgage lending. Therefore, lenders became 
reluctant to approve credit applications from applicants in 
predominantly black neighborhoods (Berry, 1979, p. 10). Evidence of 
this pattern has persisted. Racial discrimination in mortgage lending 
was shown to exist in Chicago during the early 1970's, and in 1974 it 
was shown to be an overall pattern in eighteen SMSAs across the 
country (Listokin and Casey, 1980, p. 130-135). More recent research 
has shown a racially discriminatory pattern in mortgage lending in the 
Baltimore area. The Baltimore study made use of HMDA data to 
ascertain mortgage flows (Shlay, 1987). 
Evidence of mortgage redlining is largely limited to northern, 
midwestern, and west coast cities. While some community groups in 
Florida have completed lending pattern studies, there has been no 
formal or academic research in the south. The need for such research 
became evident when a local land trust operating in a predominantly 
black neighborhood observed that many of its apparently credit-worthy 
clients were being denied mortgages by a local bank. Subsequently, a 
community group was formed to examine local financial institutions' 
CRA performance. Preliminary reviews of HMDA statements 
indicated a pattern of racial discrimination. Further research was 





In Atlanta, Georgia, does a neighborhood's racial composition 
affect the ability of its residents to obtain mortgage loans from 
regulated lenders? Working with Charles Finn of the Hubert H. 
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota and Bill 
Dedman of the Atlanta Journal/Constitution, the answer to this 
question was sought. Data for this analysis were provided by the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FIEC) in the form 
of computer tapes that contain 1985 and 1986 HMDA statements for 
each bank in the Atlanta SMSA. Printed copies of aggregate data for 
the SMSA, 1982-86, were also obtained. Although requested, the 
aggregate data were not available from the computer tapes that were 
sent. The federal Freedom of Information Act had to be used to obtain 
these tapes. 
In addition to the HMDA data, the FIEC also provided computer 
tapes containing the results of the 1980 United States Census for 
every Metropolitan area in the country. While at face value this 
appeared to be a windfall, the census tapes proved to be of little use 
for the purpose at hand. The census tapes included the census data 
for the Atlanta SMSA needed for the analysis. As one would expect, 
the census tapes listed the data in numerical order by census tract. 
The HMDA data was also listed numerically by census tract. However, 
if a financial institution made no loans in any given census tract, then 
that tract was not included in the statements. Consequently, the 
HMDA data and the census data were not directly compatible; the 
census data had to be entered by hand. 
Once the HMDA and Census data were put into a machine 
readable form, some research decisions could be made. One of the 
primary hypotheses of this research is that financial institutions use 
racial as well as economic criteria in evaluating a mortgage application. 
Therefore, a coding system was devised to evaluate each census tract 
on the bas i s of racial and economic characteristics. One of the 
primary considerations was to determine which census tracts, based 
on each tract's median household income, had a population that could 
afford to purchase a home (1980 SMSA median household income was 
$18,355). Current underwriting criteria dictates that in order to 
qualify for a mortgage an applicant's monthly mortgage payment 
cannot be greater than 28 percent of the applicant's monthly income. 
Using this percentage, it was calculated that an annual income of 
$11,563, 63 percent of the SMSA median, could support a home 
purchase price of $35,000, at mortgage terms of 9.5 percent for thirty 
years with 20 percent down.* For the purpose of this analysis, this 
amount was increased to $12,848 or 70 percent of the SMSA median 
in an effort to give greater benefit of the doubt to the lenders involved. 
The complete coding system is presented in Table 1. Census tracts 
were classified in terms of both income and race. Fourteen census 
tracts had a minority population between 80-100 percent coupled 
with a median Income between 70-122 percent of the SMSA median. 
Thirty-nine tracts fell into the classification having a minority 
population of between 0-20 percent and a median income of between 
70-122 percent of the SMSA median. 
* $35,000 is the estimated price for a home in a low-moderate 
income neighborhood in Atlanta. The interest rate charged for a fixed 
rate, 30 year mortgage by forty-three of the fifty-six lenders listed in 
the March 6, 1988 Atlanta Journal/Constitution was 9.5 percent . A 20 
percent downpayment is required for all non-insured mortgages. For 
the purpose of the calculation, 12 percent was subtracted from the 
annual income for taxes. 
Table 1 
Census Tract Categories 
Category Description 
1 Moderate-income blacks who can afford to buy a house: 
Income 70-86% SMSA median. 
Minority population 80-100%. (10 tracts) 
2 Middle-income blacks who can afford to buy a house: 
Income 87-102% SMSA median. 
Minority population 80-100%. (2 tracts) 
3 Higher-income blacks who can afford to buy a house: 
Income 103-122% SMSA median. 
Minority population 80-100%. (2 tracts) 
4 Moderate-income whites who can afford to buy a house: 
Income 70-86% SMSA median. 
Minority population 0- 20%. (9 tracts) 
5 Middle-income whites who can afford to buy a house: 
Income 87-102% SMSA median. 
Minority population 0- 20%. (19 tracts) 
6 Higher-income whites who can afford to buy a house: 
Income 103-122% SMSA median. 
Minority population 0- 20%. (19 tracts) 
7 Moderate-income integrated areas who can afford to buy a 
house: Income 70-86% SMSA median. 
Minority population 20-80%. (4 tracts) 
8 Middle-income integrated areas who can afford to buy a house: 
Income 87-102% SMSA median. 
Minority population 20-80%. (4 tracts) 
9 Higher-income integrated areas who can afford to buy a house: 
Income 103-122% SMSA median. Minority population 20-80%. 
(3 tracts) 
10 Blacks too poor to buy a house: Income below 70% SMSA median. 
Minority population 80-100%. (55 tracts) 
17 
Census Tract Categories (cont'd) 
Category Description 
11 Whites too poor to buy a house: Income below 70% SMSA median. 
Minority population 0-20%. (8 tracts) 
12 Integrated area too poor to buy a house: Income below 70% SMSA 
median. Minority population 20-80%. (13 tracts) 
13 Highest-income blacks: Income above 122% SMSA median.Minority 
population 80-100%. (0 tracts) 
14 Highest income whites: Income above 122% SMSA median. Minority 
population 0-20%. (50 tracts) 
15 Highes t - income in tegrated a r e a s : Income above 122% SMSA median. 
Minority population 20-80%. (3 tracts) 
16 Areas with enough income to afford houses, but not enough owner-
occupied houses to be comparable: Fewer than 500 owner-occupied 
housing units. (This variable is employed only when a tract would 
otherwise qualify for categories 1-9, 13 and 14—not for categories 10-
12.) (20 tracts) 
17 Areas considered not comparable because of growth rate of more than 
10% in single-family/duplex units from 1980-1987. (This variable is 
employed only when a tract would otherwise qualify for categories 1-
12—not for categories 13 or 14.) (69 tracts) 
18 Areas considered not comparable because of a decline in single-
family/ duplex units from 1980-1987. (This variable is employed only 
when a tract would otherwise qualify for categories 1-9—not for 
categories 10-14.) (6 tracts) 
19 Areas considered not comparable because they are outside the seven 
county ARC area. Although these counties are not included in the 
aggregate tables, a random sample are included in the individual bank 
tables, with each tract given a rate. However, the growth rates in 
these tracts cannot be determined. (33 tracts) 
In the classification of minority population greater than 80 
percent and median income less than 70 percent of the SMSA median 
there are 55 tracts. Eight tracts met the criteria of having a minority 
population of between 0-20 percent and a median income less than 70 
percent of the SMSA median. Fifty tracts were classified as having a 
minority population of between 0-20 percent and a median income 
greater than 122 percent of the SMSA median. There were no tracts 
with a minority population greater than 80 percent and a median 
income over 122 percent of the SMSA median. 
Census tracts with a minority population of between 20-80 
percent, not inclusive, were considered to be integrated. Eleven of 
those integrated tracts had a median income of between 70-122 
percent of the SMSA median. Twenty-one of the integrated tracts had 
a median income less than 70 percent of the SMSA median. Three had 
a median income greater than 122 percent of the SMSA median. 
The total number of owner-occupied structures was also an 
important consideration for this research. If there are very few 
structures eligible for single family mortgages, it would follow that 
there would be little demand for lending. As a result, all census tracts 
containing fewer than 500 owner-occupied structures and having a 
median income greater than 70 percent of the SMSA median were 
placed in a separate category and not included in the final analysis. 
Rapidly growing areas also tend to skew lending data. Census 
tracts in which the number of newly constructed owner-occupied 
structures is increasing will naturally have a greater demand for 
mortgages. Areas that are experiencing a decline in the number of 
owner -occupied structures will also tend to obscure the data. In light 
of this, the 69 tracts that grew in total number of single-family units by 
more than 10 percent of between 1980-87 were placed in a separate 
category and not included in the final analysis. In addition the six 
tracts that experienced decline in the total number of owner-occupied 
structures of between 1980-87 were not included in the final analysis. 
The study area was comprised of both the seven county and the 
18 county Atlanta region. The Atlanta SMSA consists of 18 counties. 
Seven core counties fall under the jurisdiction of the Atlanta Regional 
Commission (ARC). The ARC publishes annually updated census data 
for those seven counties. Therefore, although data from the 1980 
United States Census was used, it was supported by 1987 estimates. 
Even though the Census data is over eight years old, 1987 updates 
revealed that no census tracts had changed demographlcally enough 
between 1980-87 to warrant its reclassification into a different 
category. Only two counties in the metro area, Fulton and DeKalb, had 
any census tracts that had a black population of greater than 80 
percent. Every census tract in those two counties is included in the 
final analysis. Also included in the final analysis is a random sample of 
census tracts from the remaining five counties that comprise the ARC 
and the remaining 11 counties that constitute the Atlanta SMSA. 
Once the census tracts were categorized, some general patterns 
could be discerned. Forty-nine of the 55 census tracts rated 10 (at 
least 80 percent black, median income below 70 percent of the SMSA 
median) are located within the City of Atlanta. Of the ten tracts rated 
11 (population 20 percent or less black, median income below 70 
percent of the SMSA median), only five are located within the City of 
Atlanta. Eight of the 14 tracts with a black population greater than or 
equal to 80 percent and a median income between 70-122 percent of 
the SMSA median (categories 1-3) are located within the City of 
Atlanta. Of the 39 tracts that are 20 percent or less black and had a 
median income between 70-122 percent of the SMSA median 
(categories 4-6), only 6 are located within the City of Atlanta. Only 
Fulton and DeKalb counties had any census tracts with a black 
population 80 percent or higher. 
The analytical technique used in his research is similar to the 
technique used by Shlay (1987). Census tracts are categorized in 
terms of race and income (see Table 1). The number of loans per 100 
owner-occupied structures in white census tracts were compared to 
the number of loans per 100 owner-occupied structures in black 
census tracts. It differs from Shlay's technique (1987) in that actual 
demand, rather than an estimated demand, is included in the analysis. 
The analytical phase of the research consisted of two analyses of 
trends in lending patterns in the aggregate, and a series of analyses of 
the lending patterns for 17 of Atlanta's most active, regulated lenders. 
The first analysis is a breakdown of lending patterns by year, by 
category, and by loan type, for the time period 1982-86. The 
information consists of the total number and dollar amounts for 
FHA/VA, conventional, home improvement, and multi-family loans. 
Also included are the number of owner occupied structures, the 
average mortgage amount per owner-occupied structure, the average 
home improvement loan amount per owner-occupied structure, the 
percent of owner occupied s t r u c t u r e s receiving m o r t g a g e s , the 
percent of owner-occupied structures receiving home improvement 
loans, the average amount per mortgage, and the average amount per 
home improvement loan. All information contained in this report is 
reported according to the classification system described in Table 1 
only; no data are expressed on a census tract basis . The complete 
results are presented in the Appendix. 
The second aggregate analysis covers the same time period, 
1982-86. This analysis consists of a breakdown by year, by category 
and by census tract of the total number and dollar amount of all 
FHA/VA and conventional loans made by regulated lenders. There is no 
distinction made in this type of report between those two types of 
loans. Also included in this analysis are the total number of owner-
occupied structures, the percent of owner-occupied structures 
receiving mortgages, and the dollar amount of loans per structure. 
In addition to the aggregate data, analyses were conducted on 
the lending patterns of for 17 financial institutions in metropolitan 
Atlanta (Table 2). The institutions include the 15 most active lenders 
in the Atlanta market, plus Citizens Trust, a black owned bank, and 
Mutual Federal, a black owned savings and loan. Data on the most 
active lenders in the area were obtained from J . H . Kennerly, a 
researcher from Stone Mountain, Georgia, who compiled this 
information from county deed records. 
The reports generated for each bank show the census tract and 
category for every loan reported by each bank, 1985-86. Data for 1984 
were requested from the FIEC, but it was not received in a usable 
form. Mortgage information for each bank includes the number and 
dollar amounts of all FHA/VA, conventional, home improvement, and 
multi-family loans. Also included by category are the average amounts 
per mortgage and per home improvement loan, the amounts per 
owner-occupied structure for both mortgages and home improvement 
loans, the percent of owner-occupied structures receiving mortgages, 
and the percent of owner-occupied structures receiving home 
improvement loans. The percent of mortgages made in each category 
was also calculated. 
Table 2 
Individual Institutions 
1. Anchor Savings 
2. Bank South 
3. California Federal 
4. Citizens & Southern 
5. Citizens Trust 
6. Decatur Federal 
7. DeKalb Federal 
8. First American 
9. First Atlanta 
10. First Federal 
11. First Union 
12. Fulton Federal 
13. Georgia Federal 
14. Home Federal 
15. Liberty Federal 
16. Mutual Federal 
17. Trust Company 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
There are four parts to the analysis phase of this research. The 
aggregate results are based on the HMDA statements of 88 financial 
institutions in the metro Atlanta area and cover every home loan made 
by those institutions between 1982-86. The individual bank results 
evaluate the 1985-86 lending records of 17 metro Atlanta financial 
institutions. Real estate transaction records were used to examine the 
demand side of the Atlanta mortgage market. In addition, mortgage 
loan application approval/denial rates, by race of applicant, were 
reviewed for the final section of this chapter. 
Aggregate Results 
In lending markets without discrimination, neighborhood racial 
compositions will have no independent influence on the quantity of 
lending received (Shlay, 1987, p. 11). In other words, all other things 
being equal, census tracts with comparable income levels should 
receive the same number of loans on a per eligible structure basis, 
regardless of race. As it relates to this research, census tracts 
classified 1, for example, should receive a comparable number of 
loans per owner-occupied structure as census tracts classified 4. With 
this in mind, the results of the aggregate data are examined. 
Figure 1 shows the number of mortgages per 100 owner-
occupied units granted in categories 1, 2, and 3 as compared to the 
number of mortgages per 100 owner-occupied units granted in 
'saanionyis "ooo-nmo- o o i / S N V O I 
categories 4, 5, and 6, 1982-86. (Middle income blacks vs. middle 
income whites). In 1982, a year of dramatically high interest rates, the 
total volume of conventional lending was down. Even so, the number of 
mortgages per 100 structures in categories 4, 5, and 6 was 2.2 times 
the amount of lending in categories 1, 2, and 3. 
By 1983, when interest rates began to stabilize, mortgage 
lending in categories 4, 5, and 6 increased greatly. Lending in 
categories 1, 2, and 3 experienced a slight decline. The gap between 
white and black rose nearly threefold; categories 4, 5, and 6 received 
5.9 times as many mortgages per 100 owner-occupied structures than 
did categories 1/2. and 3. 
This difference leveled off slightly 1984-85 (4.7 times as many 
loans in each year, white vs. black), but once again increased to a 
difference of 6.0 times during 1986. Overall, between 1982-86 the 
number of mortgages per 100 owner-occupied structures in categories 
1, 2, and 3 Increased by nearly 25 percent. During the same time 
period, the number of mortgages per 100 owner-occupied structures 
in categories 4, 5, and 6 increased by more than 108 percent. This is 
especially important when noted that all tracts that grew in number of 
owner-occupied structures by 10 percent or more, 1980-87, were 
excluded from this analysis. 
Figure 2 extends the analysis presented in Figure 1 by 
incorporating lower Income blacks and lower income whites. The 
discrepancies in lending dropped slightly with the addition of these 
two categories. In 1982 the difference was 1.9 times, once again 
probably due to the depressed mortgage market. The differences rose 
slightly 1983-84, dropped off slightly in 1985, and then shot up to 
5.2 times in 1986. One possible explanation for the drop in 
differences between black and white with the addition of low income 
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tracts is the lending records of Citizens Trust and Mutual Federal. 
These are Atlanta's two black-owned institutions, each of which make 
the majority of their loans in category 10 (lower income, 80 percent 
or more black) census tracts. 
Some of the most revealing data is shown in Figure 3. A 
comparison of lending is made between middle Income black census 
tracts (categories 1, 2, and 3) and lower income white tracts (category 
11). As with the previous two comparisons, lending in white tracts far 
out exceeds lending in black tracts, in spite of the considerable 
difference in income. As before, lending differences were the least in 
1982. Differences shot up considerably in 1984, leveled off somewhat 
in 1985, and rose once again in 1986. What this data indicates is that 
regardless of income, residents of areas that are at least 80 percent 
white had a m u c h greater chance of receiving a mortgage from a 
regulated lender than an area that is 80 percent or more black. 
Individual Bank Results 
Given the results of the aggregate analyses, one would expect the 
individual institutions data to be dominated by loans to predominantly 
white areas. As a general rule, this proved to be the case. Since data 
was available for only two years, an average of the number of loans 
made by each institution during 1985-86, was used. No long term 
trends can be observed. What can be determined is how the market 
behaved over this two year period. Each institution was ranked by the 
ratio of number of loans per 100 owner-.pa occupied structures in 
black tracts to number of loans per 100 owner-occupied structures in 
white tracts. Included in the ratio are only loans made in the 
categories under consideration. 
Table 3 shows the seventeen banks' lending patterns in middle 
income black and white tracts (categories 1, 2, and 3, and 4, 5, and 6, 
respectively.) In this analysis, Citizens Trust, Mutual Federal, and First 
Union granted more loans to middle .pa income black census tracts 
than to middle income white tracts. However, these three banks, 
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TABLE 3 
Hon Purehiit Loins to 
Hiddle-Incoie Blacks and Whites 
INSTITUTION 
RATIO 
AVERAGE NO. NO. LOANS PER AVERAGE NO. NO. LOANS PER (LOANS/100 OWN-OCC. 
AVERAGE NO. MORTGAGES TO 100 OHNER-OCC. MORTGAGES TO 100 ONNER-OCC. STRUCTS. IN BLACK 
MORTGAGES MIDDLE INCOME STRUCTURES IN KIDDLE INCOME STRUCTURES IN MIDDLE AREAS VS. 
IN ALL AREAS BLACK AREAS * MIDDLE INCOME WHITE AREAS h MIDDLE INCOME WHITE MIDDLE AREAS) 
(1985-66) (1985-86) BLACK AREAS (1985-86) WHITE AREAS 
1. CITIZENS TRUST 14.5 0.5 0.00256 0.0 0.00000 ALL BLACK 
2. MUTUAL FEDERAL 24.5 3.0 0.01536 1.5 0.00294 5.2 1.0 
3. FIRST UNION 55.5 1.0 0.00512 1.0 0.00196 2.6 1.0 
4. FIRST FEDERAL 97.0 0.5 0.00256 2.0 0.00392 1.0 1.5 
5. ANCHOR SAVINGS 164.0 3.5 0.01792 19.0 0.03720 1.0 2.1 
6. CALIFORNIA FED 787.5 11.5 0.05890 76.5 0.14979 1.0 2.5 
7. 6A FEDERAL 2803.5 25.0 0.12803 193.0 0.37789 1.0 3.0 
8. DEKALB FEDERAL 574.5 3.5 0.01792 30.0 0.05874 1.0 3.3 
9. TRUST CO 67.5 0.5 0.00256 4.5 0.00881 1.0 3.4 
10. LIBERTY FED 1346.5 14.0 0.07170 143.5 0.28097 1.0 3.9 
11. C I S BANK 2817.0 22.5 0.11523 272.0 0.53257 1.0 4.6 
12. FULTON FEDERAL 1478.0 7.5 0.03841 110.5 0.21636 1.0 5.6 
13. DECATUR FED 3692.5 16.5 0.08450 367.0 0.71B58 1.0 '8.5 
14. FIRST ATL. 288.5 0.5 0.00256 22.5 0.04405 1.0:17.2 
15. HOME FEDERAL 1975.5 4.5 0.02305 211.5 0.41411 1.0:18.0 
16. 1ST AMER. 589.0 0.5 0.00256 52.5 0.10279 1.0:40.1 
17. BANK SOUTH 17.5 0.0 0.00000 0.5 0.00098 ALL WHITE 
TOTALS 16793.0 115.0 «f 1507.5 «m iff 
SOURCE: FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL 
NOTE: ALL FIGURES REPRESENT AN AVERAGE OF THE TWO YEARS 1985-86 
• MIDDLE INCOME BLACKS CONSISTS OF THOSE CENSUS TRACTS THAT ARE 
80 PERCENT OR MORE BLACK, AND HAVE A MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
GREATER THAN QR EQUAL TO 70 PERCENT OF THE SMSA MEDIAN. 
H KIDDLE INCOME WHITES CONSISTS OF THOSE CENSUS TRACTS THAT ARE 
80 PERCENT OR MORE WHITE, AND HAVE A MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 70 PERCENT OF THE SMSA MEDIAN, BUT LESS THAN 123 
PERCENT OF SHSA MEDIAN. 
h i TO AVOID CONFUSION WITH THE AGGREGATE FIGURES FOR ALL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, THE AVERAGES FOR THESE 17 INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN OMITTED. 
along with Bank South who made no loans to categories 1, 2, or 3, 
were the least active mortgage lenders included in the analysis. First 
Union made less than 4 percent of its total lending in category 1-6 
tracts, as did Citizens Trust. Mutual Federal made just over 12 percent 
of its total lending in tracts rated 1-6. The more active lenders 
granted more loans per eligible structure to white areas than to black 
areas . However, there is no direct correlation between overall 
mortgage activity and geographic discrepancies. The average number 
of mortgages to middle income black areas ranged from 0 (Bank 
South) to 25.0 (Georgia Federal). The average number of mortgages to 
middle income white areas ranged from 0 (Citizens Trust) to 367.0 
(Decatur Federal). Not including the three banks that made more loans 
per eligible structure to black areas than white, the ratios ranged from 
1.0:1.5 (First Federal) to 1.0:40.2 (First American). 
Table 4 is the same format as Table 3, with the addition of lower 
income blacks and whites. Once again, Citizens Trust, Mutual Federal, 
and First Union made more loans in black areas than in white. Citizens 
Trust made over 65 percent of its average number of mortgages to all 
areas to those areas rated 10. Mutual Federal made nearly 50 percent 
of its average number of loans to all areas to those areas rated 10. The 
inclusion of First Union is slightly deceptive since less than 5 percent 
of its total lending was made in categories 1-6, 10 or 11 (black and 
white areas with median income between 0-122 percent of SMSA 
median). 
The remainder of the banks once again fared quite poorly in 
terms of this ranking. Ratios range from 1:1.7 (First Federal) to 1:14.1 
(First Atlanta). Bank South, once again, bypassed all black areas, 
however, less than 6 percent of its total lending was concentrated in 
categories 4-6, and 11 (white areas with median incomes between 0-
122 percent of SMSA median. In other words, as with First Union, 
Bank South makes few loans in both middle and lower income black 
and white areas. 
TABLE 4 
Hoie Purchase Loans to Loner and 
Hiddle-Incoie Blacks and Whites 
RATIO 
AVERAGE NO, NO. LOANS PER AVERAGE NO. NO. LOANS PER (LOANS/100 ONN-QCC. 
MORTGAGES TO 100 ONNER-OCC MORTGAGES TO 100 OHNER-OCC STRUCTS. IN BLACK 
AVERAGE NO. LONER I MIDDLE STRUCTURES IN LONER AND STRUCTURES IN LONER & MIDDLE 
H0RT6A6ES INCOME LOWER tc MIDDLE MIDDLE INCOME LONER It MIDDLE AREAS VS. WHITE 
IN ALL AREAS BLACK AREAS t INCOME BLACK WHITE AREAS tt INCOME WHITE LOWER I MIDDLE 
INSTITUTION (1985-86) (1985-86) AREAS (1985-86) AREAS AREAS 
1. CITIZENS TRUST 14.5 1 0 . 0 0.02163 0.0 0.00000 ALL BLACK 
2. MUTUAL FEDERAL 24.5 14.5 0.03136 1.5 0.00294 10.7 1.0 
3. FIRST UNION 55.5 1.5 0.00324 1.0 0.00196 1.7 1.0 
4. FIRST FEDERAL 97.0 1.0 • 0.00216 2.5 0.00489 1.0 2.3 
5. LIBERTY FED 1346.5 60.5 0.13086 154.5 0.30251 1.0 2.3 
6. DEKALB FEDERAL 574.5 12.5 0.02704 32.5 0.06363 1.0 2.4 
7. TRUST CO BANK 67.5 2.0 0.00433 5.5 0.01077 1.0 2.5 
B. ANCHOR SAVINGS 164.0 7.5 0.01622 21.0 0.04112 1.0 2.5 
9. CALIFORNIA FED 7G7.5 26.5 0.05732 87.0 0.17034 1 .0 3.0 
10. GA FEDERAL 2G03.5 51.5 0.11140 209.5 0.41020 1.0 3.7 
11. CIS BANK 2817.0 52.0 0.11248 285.5 0.55900 1.0 5.0 
12. FULTON FEDERAL 147B.0 20.5 0.04434 116.0 0.22713 1.0 5.1 
13. DECATUR FED 3692.5 50.0 0.10815 402.0 0.78711 1.0:7.3 
14. HONE FEDERAL 1975.5 26.0 : 0.05624 226.0 0.44250 1.0:7.9 
1 5 . 1ST AHER. 589.0 5.0 0.01082 56.5 0.11063 1 . 0 : 1 0 . 2 
16. FIRST ATL. 2BB.5 1.5 0.00324 23.5 0.04601 1.0:14.1 
17. BANK SOUTH 17.5 0.0 0.00000 1.0 0.00196 ALL WHITE 
TOTALS 16793.0 342.5 fffi 1625.5 m tit 
SOURCE: FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL 
NOTE: ALL FIGURES REPRESENT AN AVERAGE OF THE TWO YEARS 1985-86 
« MIDDLE & LOW INCOME BLACKS CONSISTS OF THOSE CENSUS TRACTS THAT ARE 
80 PERCENT OR MORE BLACK, AND HAVE A MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
BELOW 123 PERCENT OF THE SMSA MEDIAN. 
«« MIDDLE & LOW INCOME WHITES CONSISTS OF THOSE CENSUS TRACTS THAT ARE 
80 PERCENT OR MORE WHITE, AND HAVE A MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
BELOW 123 PERCENT OF THE SHSA MEDIAN. 
m TO AVOID CONFUSION WITH THE AGGREGATE FIGURES FOR ALL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, THE AVERAGES FOR THESE 17 INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN OMITTED. 
The basic hypothesis behind the aggregate and individual bank 
analyses is that, all other things being equal, race should have no 
independent effect on the quantity of lending received. However, 
further analysis contradicts this hypothesis. Race does have an 
independent effect on the quantity of lending received. 
The Effects of Demand 
One limitation of analyses that rely on HMDA data in combination 
with census data is that this procedure only accounts for the 
household income portion of the demand for mortgage loans. Critics 
contend that blacks and whites of similar incomes have different 
propensities to seek mortgage loans. In 1986 the level of lending in 
middle class white areas was 6.0 times the level in middle class black 
areas possibly because the demand for mortgages in white areas was 
6.0 times the demand in black areas. Another often used argument is 
that a bank's mortgage company subsidiary makes the loans in black 
neighborhoods. HMDA statements do not include number of loan 
applicants, number of denials, reasons for denial, nor do they include 
the lending records of unregulated lenders, such a s mortgage 
companies. Shlay attempted to compensate for this shortcoming by 
constructing a mortgage demand model. This model attempts to 
predict what the demand for mortgages should be in any census tract, 
given certain characteristics (percent of owner-occupied structures, 
more new housing, higher vacancy rates, etc.) (Shlay, 1980, p. 38). 
The research conducted on Atlanta compensates for this 
shortcoming in the HMDA data in a different way. Information 
published by Real Estate Data Incorporated (REDI) was used to 
examine all mortgage activity within certain census tracts. Shlay uses a 
calculation to predict, given certain conditions, the number of 
mortgages a census tract should receive. The REDI data shows the 
actual number of mortgages received per census tract, regardless of 
the type of lender (regulated or unregulated). 
Books published by REDI give grantor, grantee, mortgagee, and 
type of mortgage (FHA, VA, FhMA, etc.). Data is published for each 
county in the metro Atlanta area, dating back to 1974. The DeKalb 
County Board of Realtors has these books in its library. Data is sorted 
by land lot and district. In order to make use of the data, a census 
tract has to first be defined in terms of land lot and district. Each 
district and land lot must then be checked in the REDI data book, 
transaction by transaction. Since the land lot and district boundaries 
do not directly coincide with census tract boundaries, for each 
transaction within the appropriate land lot and district, a cross 
reference giving all streets and addresses within any given census 
tract had to be used. Needless to say, this data is very difficult and very 
time consuming to obtain. 
In one sense the apparent incompleteness of the HMDA/census 
data does not present a problem. Regulated depository institutions are 
required by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to meet the 
credit needs of their community. One rationale behind this line of 
thought is that these regulated institutions are taking deposits from a 
community, and should therefore be required to reinvest in that 
community. Mortgage companies do not take deposits from anyone. 
Consequently, the "Our mortgage company makes loans in those 
neighborhoods" defense is truly no defense at all. 
Nevertheless, in an effort to get a more complete picture of the 
Atlanta mortgage market and to test the validity of the "differing 
propensities" and the "subsidiary mortgage company" arguments, the 
transactions in twenty-three census tracts for 1986 were analyzed. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 gives a breakdown by category of the average number of 
loans per tract, the total number of loans per occupied structure, the 
percent of the loans originating with a regulated lender, (in this case 
either a bank or a savings and loan), and the percent of the total 
number of loans made by a mortgage subsidiary of a regulated lender. 
In 1986 demand for loans was slightly higher in white tracts than in 
TABLE 5 
Loans by Regulated and 
Unregulated Lenders 
X OF LOANS 














1 48 3.8 7.9 3.1 
2 64 :" 4.6 6.3 0.0 
3 26 1.6 11.8 2.0 
76 8.9 29.0 8.3 
5 118 8.7 29.8 7.7 
94 B.4 40.4 B.5 
134 5.6 4.5 3.4 
10 75 6.3 5.4 2.0 
11 3B 11.3 25.7 9.7 
CATE6QRY 1 MODERATE INCOME BLACKS. MEDIAN INCOME 70-86* OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 8 0 - 1 0 0 % 
CATE60RY 2 MIDDLE INCOME BLACKS. MEDIAN INCOME 8 7 - 1 0 2 % OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 8 0 - 1 0 0 % 
CATE60RY 3 HIGHER INCOME BLACKS. MEDIAN INCOME 103-1221 OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 8 0 - 1 0 0 % 
CATE80RY 4 MODERATE INCOME WHITES. MEDIAN INCOME 70-86* OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 0-20% 
CATEGORY 5 MIDDLE INCOME NHITES. MEDIAN INCOME 87-1022 OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 0-20% 
CATEGORY 6 HIGHER INCOME NHITES. MEDIAN INCOME 103-122% OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 0-20% 
CATEGORY 9 HIGHER INCOME INTEGRATED. MEDIAN INCOME 103-122% OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 2 1 - 7 9 % 
CATEGORY 10 LOW INCOME BLACKS. MEDIAN INCOME BELON 7 0 % OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 8 0 - 1 0 0 % 
CATEGORY 11 LOW INCOME NHITES. MEDIAN INCOME BELON 7 0 % OF 
SMSA MEDIAN, BLACK POPULATION 0-20% 
1 
black tracts. In category 4 the overall demand was 2.3 times that of 
category 1. However, regulated lenders made 4.3 times as many loans 
in category 4 than in category 1. Regulated lenders accounted for 29.0 
percent of all loans made in category 4, but for only 7.9 percent of all 
loans made in category 1. The overall demand for mortgages in 
category 5 was 1.9 times the demand in category 2. Regulated .pa 
lenders made 7.2 times as many loans in category 5 than in category 2. 
Regulated lenders accounted for 29.8 percent of all loans in category 
5, but for only 6.3 percent of all loans in category 2. In category 6 the 
overall demand for mortgages was 5.2 times the demand in category 3. 
Regulated lenders made 6.2 times as many loans in category 6 than in 
category 3. Regulated lenders made 40.4 percent of the loans in 
category 6, compared to 11.8 percent of the loans in .pa category 3. 
Higher income integrated tracts fared the worst in terms of obtaining 
loans from regulated lenders. The sample tracts coded 9 received only 
4.5% of their total mortgages from banks and savings and loans. The 
demand for mortgages in category 9* based on number of mortgages 
granted per 100 owner occupied structures, was comparable to 
demand in the majority white census tracts, in which the regulated 
lenders were responsible for up to 40 percent of all mortgage activity. 
Category 10 tracts also fared poorly in this analysis, especially when 
compared to category 11. While demand for mortgages in category 11 
was less 1.8 that of tracts in category 10, regulated lenders accounted 
for 4.8 times as many loans in category 11 than in category 10. 
Regulated lender mortgage subsidiaries also made 4.8 times as many 
loans in category 11 than in category 10. 
This research also reveals that bank's mortgage companies in 
general are not very active in tracts that had a black population of at 
least 80%, regardless of income. This fact is especially noteworthy 
when compared to the level of activity by banks' mortgage companies 
in low income white tracts. Nearly 10 percent of all mortgages in 
category 11 were originated by a mortgage company that is a 
subsidiary of a bank. There was 5.0 times as much activity by these 
mortgage companies in these low-income white tracts than in the 
highest income black tracts. This data does not support the argument 
in 
that banks use their mortgage companies to meet the credit needs of 
black communities. 
Research based on this data certainly has its limitations. Due to 
the format of the original data, it would be incredibly time-consuming 
to construct a lending record for each actor in the entire mortgage 
market. Consequently, aggregate data was all that was obtained. 
Practicality also dictated that data from only one year was analyzed. It 
should be pointed out that the 1986 time period the ratio of 
loans/structures for whites versus blacks was as great as it ever was 
during the study period (Figure 1, p.31 and Figure 2, p. 33). Thus, had 
this analysis been conducted in 1982 the results might have been 
substantially different. Overall, in 1986, demand for mortgage loans in 
white census tracts was 2.3 times the demand in black census tracts. 
In this s a m e year regulated lenders made 5.5 times as many loans in 
white census tracts than in black census tracts. The lack of regulated 
lender activity in black census tracts could have a negative impact on 
demand. Mortgage loans from unregulated lenders are often more 
expensive than mortgage loans from regulated lenders. Consequently, 
credit in black census tracts may be unaffordable for many of the 
residents, resulting in a lower demand. Even if this affordability 
argument is ignored, differing propensities of similar income blacks 
and whites does not completely explain the differences in mortgage 
flows. This research indicates that there is demand for mortgage loans 
in predominantly black census tracts, and that neither regulated 
lenders nor their subsidiaries are meeting this demand. 
Approvals and Denials 
Tangent to the demand argument is the hypothesis that blacks 
simply do not apply to regulated lenders for mortgage loans. When 
blacks do apply, the hypothesis contends, they are rejected at no 
higher of a rate than white applicants. Information on applicant 
approval/rejection rates by race of applicant is very difficult to obtain. 
While all institutions are required to make this information available to 
its regulating agency, the regulators do not consider it to be public 
information, nor do the regulators consider it to be covered under the 
Freedom of Information Act. However, two of Atlanta's largest 
institutions, Georgia Federal Savings Bank and Fulton Federal Savings 
and Loan, chose to make the information available. 
During 1987 21 percent of all black applicants at Georgia 
Federal were rejected. During this same time period only 5 percent of 
all white applicants were denied credit. Thirty-six percent of all black 
applicants were denied credit at Fulton Federal between 1985-87. 
Only 10 percent of all white applicants were rejected during this same 
time period. Applicants who withdrew voluntarily were not included in 
these calculations. 
This approval/rejection analysis by no means completely refutes 
the hypothesis that if blacks applied for loans they would be rejected 
at no higher rate than whites. It does, however, indicate that this may 
not be the case. What is clear is that this type of information, along 
with the reasons for credit denial, needs to be made public in order to 
gain a better understanding of the situation. 
Summary of Results 
This research was conducted in such a manner that any 
lending differences between white and black areas would be 
underestimated. For example, rapidly growing census tracts have a 
much higher demand for mortgages than stable census tracts, and 
consequently rapidly growing tracts were not included in the final 
analysis. In Atlanta these fast growing tracts are overwhelmingly white. 
As a result, their elimination decreased the difference in the quantity 
of lending between white and black census tracts. Any census tract 
with fewer than 500 owner-occupied structures was also eliminated 
from the final analysis. This helped insure that those census tracts 
containing a large public housing project would not be included. Since 
public housing in Atlanta is predominantly black, the inclusion of these 
tracts would have increased the difference in lending between white 
and black census tracts. It was calculated that residents in a census 
tract with a median income of 63 percent of the SMSA median could 
afford to purchase a home. The analysis increased this percentage to 
70 percent. Since there are more black census tracts with median 
incomes between 63-70 percent of the SMSA median than white 
census tracts, and since these black tracts received few loans from 
regulated lenders, this also tended to underestimate the differences in 
mortgage flows between white and black areas. 
Despite these safeguards, the differences in lending quantities 
between white and black census tracts is staggering. Between 1982-86 
regulated lenders in Atlanta made 4.7 times as many loans in middle 
income white census tracts than in middle income black census 
tracts. Further analysis revealed that differences in demand accounted 
for less than half of this difference in lending. Two Atlanta savings and 
loans released approval/denial information by race of applicant. Black 




The results of this research present overwhelming evidence that 
mortgage loan applicants from geographic areas that are at least 80 
percent black have a more difficult time obtaining credit than 
applicants from areas that are between 0-20 percent black. These 
lending patterns exist despite federal laws making them illegal. They 
exist despite annual reviews of lending records by federal regulators in 
charge of enforcing these laws. Future policy aimed at breaking this 
pattern must focus on three distinct levels: federal government, local 
government, and community-based organizations. 
Federal Level 
As it is currently enforced, the federal Community Reinvestment 
Act is an incomplete means of encouraging community reinvestment. 
One of the main problems lies with the regulators themselves. These 
regulators' primary responsibility is insuring the safety of deposits in 
federally regulated banks and savings and loans. Due to the recent 
reorganization of the banking industry, coupled with the crisis 
suffered by the savings and loan industry in the early 1980s, regulators 
have had little time to monitor CRA activity. In fact, according to the 
consumer group BankWatch, the annual number of examiner hours 
spent on banks' compliance with consumer regulations dropped by 74 
percent, 1980-84, at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the three agencies that regulate the vast majority of banks and savings 
and loans (Dedman, 1988, 14A). In an effort to insure proper 
enforcement of the law, monitoring CRA compliance should become 
the responsibility of an agency other than the four agencies with which 
it currently resides. The United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development or the U.S. Department of Just ice are the two 
most likely candidates. Either of these agencies would be able to 
conduct CRA examinations separately from safety and soundness 
examinations. 
In addition to changes in the agencies administering the law, 
certain improvements need to be made in the law itself. All 
institutions are currently graded on their CRA performance on an 
annual basis by their respective regulator. However, only aggregate 
regional summaries (and not individual bank grades are made public. 
As a result, the law does not offer community groups needed 
information when negotiating with an institution or when filing a 
challenge. 
Even if the grades were made public, it is doubtful that they 
would be very beneficial. In spite of the racially discriminatory lending 
patterns revealed by the Atlanta research, in 1986 only nine out of 792 
banks in ten Southern states received "less than satisfactory" grades. 
Of the 318 savings and loans in the same area, only four received a 
grade of "needs improvement". No institutions were graded 
"unsatisfactory" or "substantially inadequate" (Dedman, 1988, p. 15A). 
Future changes in the CRA should insure that only institutions with 
immaculate records receive a high grade. These top grade institutions 
should be allowed to expand their powers. Average or poor grade 
banks should be allowed to expand only if they make specific 
commitments to improve their record (Dedman, May 3, 1988, p. 14A). 
Recent Congressional hearings did produce one positive change 
in the CRA. Beginning with 1988, all bank subsidiary mortgage 
companies must disclose the location of their mortgages. Much more 
needs to be done. Mortgage loan approval/denial rates by race of 
applicant, with reason for denial, should be made public. HMDA 
statements should include all census tracts in an institution's service 
area, regardless of whether the institution was active in that tract. 
This would make HMDA data and census data more comparable. 
Without these changes, any long-term, broad-based solutions to these 
credit shortfall problems are highly unlikely. 
Local Level 
One of the best examples of action that can be taken at the local 
level involves the use of linked deposits. Linked deposits is the name 
given to the policy of using public deposits at below market interest 
rates to increase mortgage lending in low and moderate-income and 
minority neighborhoods. The cost of purchasing, renovating, and 
constructing housing has soared out of the reach of many families, 
while federal funding provided to housing has decreased. Linked 
deposits are used as a leveraging mechanism that can both lower 
interest rates and make additional funds available to construct, 
purchase, or rehabilitate single and multi-family dwellings (Revere and 
Swift, 1985, p. 1). 
Chicago's East Humbolt Park neighborhood is an example of a 
success story in the use of linked deposits. The State of Illinois 
Treasurer's office, a local bank, and the community agreed to a special 
program. The State Treasurer deposited $1 million in the bank for 
two years at a rate of 1 percent below the prevailing market rate. In 
turn, the bank made mortgage loans to the community at a rate that 
was, on the average, approximately 3 percent below the prevailing 
market rate. The interest rate on the mortgage was guaranteed for ten 
years and amortized over 25 years. The bank used its normal 
underwriting criteria for these loans, with the understanding that the 
lower interest rates would make the loans affordable to the 
community. A 20 percent downpayment was initially required, but 
eventually was lessened to 10 percent. Private mortgage insurance 
was purchased by the bank; the borrower paid the 1/2% premium 
(Revere and Swift, 1985, p. 3). 
Two community groups played a crucial role in the success of 
this program. A HUD-certified counseling agency located within the 
community screened all applicants and accompanied them to the 
bank for their application interview. The mission of this group was 
twofold. They were to discourage ineligible applicants from applying, 
thereby saving the bank staff time, and they were to discourage real 
estate agencies involved in speculation in the neighborhood from using 
the program to their own ends. Another result of this group's activities 
was it made the applicant feel more at ease during the interview at the 
bank. The second community group involved with the project was the 
umbrella organization that initiated the program. This group's role was 
to market the program to area residents (Revere and Swift, 1985, p. 
7). 
The first year of this program (1981-82) saw only 12 loans 
made, and only $250,000 dispersed. One of the main reasons for this 
was that very few residents could afford a 20 percent downpayment. 
After six months of negotiations the program was revived with only a 
10 percent downpayment required. Within less than a year 23 
additional loans were made and all funds were dispersed (Revere and 
Swift, 1985, p. 5). 
Linked deposits are a way for local governments, a s well as 
individuals or organizations that have idle funds, to achieve both 
financial and social objectives. A large financial commitment is 
necessary, especially if a program is initiated in a geographic area 
larger than a neighborhood. In the Chicago example, $1 million 
resulted in only 35 loans over a two year period (Revere and Swift, 
1985). However, it is an option that should not be overlooked when 
assessing funding mechanisms designed to meet the housing needs of 
low and moderate income families. 
Community Level 
At the community level CRA activity involves negotiation and 
challenges. The past four years have shown a flurry of CRA challenges. 
The main reason for this increase has been the advent of interstate 
banking laws. These laws have made it possible for banks and savings 
and loans to conduct business in other states. The result of this has 
been that these institutions are making more and more CRA 
challengeable moves, resulting in more challenges by communities. 
One of the leaders in CRA challenges and subsequent 
agreements has been Florida. In the summer of 1985 several Florida 
Legal Service groups got together to file a challenge against Landmark 
Bank, who had applied for permission to merge with C & S bank of 
Atlanta. Legal Services, along with several community-based 
organizations began to investigate Landmark's compliance with the 
CRA. Branches were checked to make sure that CRA posters were In 
place. Public comment files and CRA statements were reviewed. HMDA 
statements for four years were analyzed to determine where 
Landmark's mortgage loans were being made. A credit needs study was 
made in local areas to determine community perceptions of 
Landmark's effort to meet their credit needs (Head, 1987, p. 4). 
These actions resulted in the accumulation of information that 
cast serious doubt over Landmark's compliance with the CRA. As a 
result, a challenge was filed with the Federal Reserve, asking that the 
merger be denied. After receiving the challenge, the Federal Reserve 
delayed consideration of C & S' application, and instead, encouraged 
the bank to negotiate with the community groups to see if the issues 
could be resolved. After about four weeks of negotiation an agreement 
was reached. While no numerical dollar goal for lending was reached, 
C & S did agree to implement several initiatives designed to create 
support for housing and economic development activities. Among 
these initiatives was the creation of a community enterprise banking 
department that would work with entrepreneurs, community groups 
and enterprises that may have difficulty in acquiring traditional credit, 
and structure loan and financing packages to meet the credit needs of 
these groups. A charitable contributions policy acknowledging the 
importance of community-based groups working with housing and 
economic development and pledges to support these activities was 
adopted. Subsequent agreements In Florida have netted an estimated 
$100 million in lending agreements between banks and low and 
moderate-Income areas . Over $500,000 has been committed in 
charitable contributions to assist community-based organizations in 
their administration and technical ass is tance needs. Quarterly 
meetings between the bank and the community group allow for 
continued assessment of the bank's performance under the agreement 
(Head, 1987, p. 5). 
North Carolina is another state which has seen an increase in 
CRA activity. Its statewide CRA Coordinating Committee has a broad-
b a s e d membership that includes low-income workers and 
homeowners, senior citizens, minority business people, pastors, 
community activists and persons working in community economic 
development, tenants organizations, the NAACP, day care centers, and 
Legal Services programs. In April of 1987 the Committee reached an 
agreement with Wachovia Bank which, among other things, called for 
special emphasis and creative credit approaches for increasing the 
availability of low and moderate-income housing, applying flexible 
credit underwriting guidelines, and providing low cost basic banking 
services. Commitments were also made by the bank to provide support 
for community-based organizations through charitable contributions. 
The group monitors the banks progress through quarterly meetings 
(Head, 1987, p. 6). 
San Antonio is an example of a city that has received positive 
results from CRA activities. The San Antonio Reinvestment Alliance 
(SARA) cons i s t s of 21 Black churches, various community 
development organizations, and Black businesses in the Chamber of 
Commerce. A recent SARA success was a $5 million lending 
commitment from the National Bank of Commerce. The credit 
package provided for interim construction loans for 1-4 unit 
dwellings, home improvement loans, and commercial loans for start­
ups, acquisitions and expansions at 1 percent above prime, the bank is 
currently ahead of schedule in its target of lending $1 million per year 
(Head, 1987, p. 7). 
These three CRA success stories all have certain aspects in 
common. Each community group had a broad base of support from the 
community. This gave the community group a bit of leverage, which is 
a critical part of any successful CRA challenge. For example, when 
negotiations broke down between the Indiana Reinvestment Alliance 
(IRA) and two local banks over the creation of a loan pool, an IRA 
negotiator revealed that he had authorization from four churches 
indicating that they would withdraw their money from the banks 
involved if loan pool was not funded. The bankers took a ten minute 
break and returned to announce that they would contribute to the 
pool. Negotiators must have this type of support to be effective (Head, 
1987, p. 8). 
In each case the bank was involved with an acquisition or 
merger. Delays due to a CRA challenge were very costly, prompting a 
quick settlement through negotiation. In addition, community-based 
housing groups were already established in the community. This gave 
the negotiators an established vehicle that they could encourage the 
banks to fund. 
Several developments must occur before a community can 
realize the benefits of CRA activities. There must be broad-based 
support within the community. Challenges should be directed against 
institutions undergoing acquisitions in which delays would be very 
costly. The identification of existing and the encouragement of new 
community-based groups who would be the recipients of any loan 
agreements is also essential for any successful CRA initiatives. 
Conclusions 
This research documents the presence of serious inequities in 
the Atlanta lending market. Areas that are at least 80 percent black 
receive fewer loans than areas that are only 0-20 percent black. 
Demand may explain, in part, why these inequities exist. However, 
over and above demand, areal racial composition directly influences 
the flow of mortgage credit. The lack of credit in certain areas 
decreases the opportunity for a healthy and stable housing market. 
There is hope for ending this pattern. A series of articles in the 
Atlanta Journal/Constitution (May 1-4, 1988) based on this research 
resulted in local financial institutions committing $65 million in below 
market rate mortgages to low-moderate income and minority 
neighborhoods. In addition to the use of the media, federal, local, and 
community-based action can force regulated lenders into meeting 
their community's credit needs. 
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82 2 2 1 29 8 320 9 349 34 221 0 0 2770 1125.99 •79 .78 .321 1.231 • 3 8 , 7 7 7 . 7 8 •4,300.00 
82 3 2 0 0 23 535 23 535 37 380 0 0 3207 1166.82 •118.49 .721 1.151 •23,240.87 • 1 0 , 2 7 0 . 2 7 
82 4 9 II 439 147 6795 158 7234 134 1055 0 0 10511 1688.23 •100 .37 1.501 1.271 •45,784.81 • 7 , 8 7 3 . 1 3 
82 5 18 25 1403 221 11177 246 12580 261 2816 0 0 23880 1526.80 • 1 1 7 . 9 2 1.031 1.091 •31 ,138 .21 •10 ,789 .27 
82 6 12 I I 551 194 8772 205 9323 190 2236 1 1367 16682 1558.87 •134.04 1.23X 1.141 •45,478.05 • 1 1 , 7 4 8 . 4 2 
82 7 4 4 157 26 806 30 964 48 263 1 1300 5588 1172.51 •47 .07 .541 .861 •32,133.33 • 5 , 4 7 9 . 1 7 
82 8 4 5 245 75 3783 80 4028 82 586 0 0 5637 1714.56 •103.96 1.421 1.451 •50,350.00 •7 ,144 .34 
82 9 3 12 510 22 583 34 1093 76 525 0 0 6577 , M66.19 •79.82 .521 1.161 •32 ,147.04 •4,907.89 
82 10 55 10 248 175 4788 185 5036 253 1791 5 2096 26705 1188.58 •67 .07 .691 .931 •27 ,221 .62 •7 ,079.05 
82 11 10 0 0 52 2191 52 2191 51 514 1 38 3920 1538.93 • 1 3 1 . 1 2 1.331 1.301 •42,134.42 •10,078.43 
82 12 21 3 107 67 2450 70 2554 100 1033 1 300 10865 1233.07 •95.08 .641 .921 •36,485.71 •10,330.00 
82 14 50 2IB 13567 2531 188322 2749 201899 1497 23902 21 3971 108449 11 , 861 .70 •220.40 2.531 1.381 •73,444.53 •13,944.40 
82 15 3 3 189 40 2236 43 2425 70 686 0 0 6694 1362.26 •102.48 .641 1.051 •56,395.35 •9,800.00 
82 16 22 4 226 271 15825 275 16051 88 1159 0 0 6209 •2,585.12 •186.66 4.43X 1.421 •38,367.27 • 1 3 , 1 7 0 . 4 3 
82 17 60 404 21144 1944 95047 2348 116161 1416 13375 8 1835 118685 •978.73 •112.69 1.981 1.191 •49,472.32 •9,445.42 
82 IB 6 4 152 106 6529 n o 6881 89 821 0 0 7602 •905.16 •108.00 I.4SX 1 . 1 7 1 •62,554.55 •9 ,224.72 
82 19 33 4 123 287 B7M 291 8B67 433 3370 0 0 38726 •228.97 •87.02 .751 1 .121 •30,470.79 •7 ,782 .91 
4 
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